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COMMERCIAL BUILDERS OF
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA V. CITY OF
SACRAMENTO: COMMERCE CREATES

POVERTY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Commerce creates poverty, at least under the reasoning of the
majority in Commercial Builders of Northern California v. City of
Sacramento.' While the actual, as opposed to legal, truth of that
proposition should be subject to debate, the immediate effect of
Commercial Builders is that legislatures in the Ninth Circuit can
force real estate developers to choose between two onerous options.2 First, a developer seeking permission to build can pay the
government an exaction designed to fund essentially limitless arrays
of income redistribution programs alleged to have been necessitated
by the developer's commercial activity. Alternatively, a developer
can refuse to pay for the social programs, effectively abandoning
plans for his property as economically unjustifiable for lack of a
simple, yet essential, building permit.'
Part II of this comment presents an overview of the most
salient points of the majority and dissenting opinions. Part I
outlines the relevant constitutional context for this case. Part IV
analyzes the Commercial Builders decision in light of applicable
precedent. Part V considers the societal implications of the decision. Unlike contemporary works which deconstruct legal texts to

1. 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992).
2. See Stephen Chapman, A City Pays For Social Programs By Fleecing Developers,
Cn. TRIe., Oct. 13, 1991, Perspective Section, at 3.
3. See Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926) (striking
down on equal protection grounds statute conditioning a privilege, as opposed to a right,
to use public highways upon the relinquishment of the right to receive just compensation
for takings) Commenting on the effect of the statute, the Frost Court noted that "the
carrier is given no choice, except a choice between the rock and the whirlpool,--an option
to forego a privilege which may be vital to his livelihood or submit to a requirement
which may constitute an intolerable burden." Id. See also discussion infra part I.D.
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uncover systemic bias and oppression,4 this comment advances a
classic stare decisis theme, i.e., because the Commercial Builders
court did not properly construe and apply relevant decisional law,
the case was wrongly decided.
The majority opinion in Commercial Builders is flawed on
several bases. At the outset, the court demonstrated a fundamental
misunderstanding of Fifth Amendment property rights by applying
the privilege-based principles of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine to rights-based takings analysis. 5 The court then misconstrued the relevant test under which the constitutionality of the
ordinance was to be measured by failing to differentiate two of the
test's main prongs.6 This analytical fusion, coupled with the
court's purported application of an undefined centrist standard,7 its
disregard of the leading decision's calls for heightened scrutiny,'
and its stubborn reliance on renegade precedent,9 engendered an
improper application of rational basis scrutiny to the ordinance in
direct contravention of Supreme Court precedent.'0 Moreover, on
the given facts, the Commercial Builders court should have struck
down Sacramento's ordinance for failing even the weak rational
basis test."
The Commercial Builders decision opened the door to increased legislative interference with individual rights in property
supposedly protected by the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. 12
Since the Supreme Court has denied certiorari, 13 Commercial
Builders will serve to weaken the property rights of individuals for
years to come.

4. See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 404 (1987) (arguing that legal
reasoning itself serves to legitimate systems of oppression).
5. See discussion infra part IV.A.
6. See discussion infra part W.B.
7. See discussion infra part W.B.1.
8. See discussion infra part IV.B.2.
9. See discussion infra part IV.B.3.
10. See discussion infra part IV.B.
11. See discussion infra part IV.C.
12. See discussion infra part V.
13. Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992).
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OVERVIEW OF THE DECISION

A.

Majority Opinion: Schroeder
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The Commercial Builders decision arose after the City of
Sacramento (the "City") enacted the Housing Trust Fund Ordinance
(the "Ordinance") which conditioned the granting of permits for
non-residential development on the payment of exactions to fund
low-rent housing projects.' 4 Commercial Builders of Northern California (the "Builders") challenged the Ordinance, arguing that it
constituted a taking requiring just compensation under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. s
Finding that the City had shown the nexus required under
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 6 "between nonresidential development and the demand for low-income housing," the
district court for the Eastern District of California granted the City
summary judgment.17 The Builders appealed. 8 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision below on three principal
bases.' 9
First, the Ninth Circuit concluded there was a rational relationship between the exaction and the cost of the low-rent housing
projects. 20 While building permit conditions not supporting their
articulated purposes, such as conditioning the vacation of platted
streets on the dedication of geothermal wells to a municipality,
would violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
court determined that the Ordinance did not impose such a condition."
The applicable test, which the court likened to the test for
subdivision exactions, determines whether the conditions placed on
development are reasonably related to legitimate public purposes.'
Two factors militated in favor of the finding of a reasonable relationship in Commercial Builders: a formal study establishing the

14. Id. at 872-74.
15. Id. at 873.
16. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
17. See Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 873.
18. Commercial BAilders, 941 F.2d at 872.
19. Commercial Builders was a 2-1 decision. This comment will focus primarily on the
majority opinion, with references passint to the most salient points of the dissent.
20. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 874.
21. Id. at 873-74; see, Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 1983) (geothermal well dedication).
22. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 874.
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likelihood that non-residential development would create a need for
housing projects to shelter the low-income workers attracted to the
development, and the modest size of the exaction assessed against
developers in relation to the estimated cost of the housing projects.23
Second, the court rejected the contention that Nollan required
a more direct relationship between development and the problems
created by development.2 4 The Builders had argued that the
Nollan test required that an ordinance's conditions need not merely
be ones the government "might rationally have decided" to use for
an articulated purpose, but that the conditions "substantially advance" that purpose.' This argument failed to convince the court
that Nollan required a higher level of scrutiny. The court stated
that the Nollan Court did not rule on "how close a 'fit' between
the condition and the burden is required" but merely employed a
nationally consistent centrist approach to strike down an exaction
ordinance which had failed to meet even the lowest standard of
review.

26

The court buttressed its view of the applicable level of scrutiny by referencing its recent reversal of a case which had struck
down under Nollan principles a law requiring a developer to undertake off-site environmental mitigation measures. The lower court
had erroneously interpreted Nollan as requiring "too close a nexus"
between the law and its articulated purpose. 27 The proper interpretation of Nollan, according to the Commercial Builders court, was
that exactions will not be upheld where there is no evidence of a
connection between the development and the social ill the exaction
is designed to alleviate. Under that formulation, Sacramento did not
have to show that non-residential development was directly responsible for creating a need for housing projects.
In the third component of its majority opinion, the Court
rejected the proposition that the Ordinance was a taking per se
rather than a land use regulation "subject to a reasonableness analysis." 28 If the Ordinance were treated like a physical, or per se,

23. Id.
24. Id. at 874-75.
25. Id. at 874.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 874 (citing Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 939
F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'g 733 F. Supp. 1399 (D. Nev. 1990)).
28. Id. at 875-76.
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taking the Court argued, just compensation would be required for
every fee. Citing the lack of a requisite theoretical basis, the court
declined to establish such a precedent. The Commercial Builders
court's specific holding and the new law of the case, was that "[a]
purely financial exaction ...
will not constitute a taking if it is
made for the purpose of paying a social cost that is reasonably
related to the activity against which the fee is assessed."29
B.

Dissent: Beezer

In a stinging dissent, Judge Beezer attacked the heart the
majority opinion, the interpretation of the cause and effect relationship required under the Fifth Amendment between commercial
development and housing needs."0 Judge Beezer noted that, historically, exactions imposed on subdivision developers have been
justified because they directly furthered a government interest in
one of two ways.
First, an exaction designed to pay for public goods necessitated by development serves to alleviate a public burden created by
private actors. 31 A second justification focuses on the equity of a
developer ameliorating any harmful effects caused by the development.32 The premise underlying both rationales is that private parties essentially forced costs on the community at large. When an
exaction addresses a social effect actually caused by development,
all parties bear responsibility for costs of their own making.3 3
Judge Beezer illustrated this point using a residential development scenario. 4 In the case of a subdivision, an exaction designed to fund newly demanded infrastructure ensures that the
larger community is not saddled with the expense of streets, sewers
or schools. These public goods benefit the developer by benefiting
the residents of the subdivision. By paying the exaction, the developer pays the cost of the infrastructure and passes the cost on to
his customers. Both the community and the development-the devel-

29. Id. at 876.
30. Id. (Beezer, J., dissenting).
31. See generally R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to
Community Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1987).
32. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 877.
33. See, e.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1983) (fee imposed to fund county level park
system).
34. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 877.
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oper and his customers-benefit. The community grows; the residents obtain needed infrastructure.3 5
However, Judge Beezer observed, exaction schemes that require no connection between a development and its allegedly attendant problems do not benefit the development.36 In Commercial
Builders, the Judge argued, the study commissioned by Sacramento
to support an application of the Ordinance had demonstrated "at
best a tenuous and theoretical connection between development and
housing needs., 37 Judge Beezer noted that the study itself stated
that its "nexus analysis does not make the case that building construction is responsible for growth."38 The Takings Clause,
though, "requires a cause-and-effect relationship" between develop39
ment and related social costs.
The Ordinance, opined Beezer, was simply "a transparent
attempt to force commercial developers to underwrite social policy"40 and "nothing more than a convenient way to fund a system
of transfer payments." 4' He concluded by predicting that exactions
imposed on development for the purpose of funding a wide array
of income redistribution programs would be upheld under the aegis
of Commercial Builders.42
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
A.

The Takings Clause

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides in relevant
part, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation. 43 In Commercial Builders, the Builders argued

35. Id In this balanced scenario, the government neither seeks to levy a special tax on
new development nor does it aim to subsidize private ventures with public funds.
36. Id
37. Id

38. Id
39. Id. at 877.

40. Id. at 876.
41. Id. at 877.
42. Some examples include child-care and health care delivery systems. Id. at 878.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause, including its just compensation requirement, applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 159 (1980); Chicago, B. & Q. R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897); see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITTIONAL LAW § 11.11 (4th ed. 1991). A state cannot escape the Takings Clause's
just compensation requirement by taking property for private, rather than for public use.
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896).
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that the private property taken was the money demanded by the
City to pay for the public good of low-rent housing projects.'
Permissible public uses are legion. 45 The Takings Clause was not
designed "to limit... governmental interference with property
rights. . . , but rather to secure compensation [when] otherwise
proper interference amount[s] to a taking."
Accordingly, the
Builders did not attack the lawfulness of the City's demand for
private property; they simply challenged the Ordinance as failing to
accord just compensation. The means Sacramento used to fund
housing projects were central to the case, and the end of increasing
low-rent housing projects, essentially peripheral.4'
The prototypical takings case involves an element of physical
invasion. Governmental actions effecting permanent physical occupations of property are regarded as the most extreme form of taking-takings per se. 48 For example, a city ordinance forcing apartment owners to allow the installation of cable television receivers
on their buildings was held to be per se taking. 49 The main issue
in the per se context is the amount of compensation to be accorded. It is understandable then, that the Builders tried to convince the
Commercial Builders court the Ordinance was closely analogous to
a per se taking because it required a transfer of money.
Since the Takings Clause requires just compensation for government taking of property, and since money is simply liquid
property, the Ordinance's mandated transfer of property requires

44. Commercial Builders, 941 F,2d at 875.
45. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (concluding that legislatures are
permitted to define public use expansively); John J. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and
the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Takings Impasse in Land Use Controversies,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1036 (1975) (public use limitation of Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments is defined broadly).
'
46. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987); Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685,
689 (1897) ("The constitutional guarantee of just compensation is not a limitation on the
power to take, but only a condition of its exercise."); see generally Michael M. Berger,
Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New Ground Rules for
Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735 (1988) (analysis of First English and Nollan by
the attorney who represented the petitioners in First English).
47. See Nollan v. California Coastal Conun'n, 483 U.S., 825, 834-35 (1987) ("[A]
broad range of governmental purposes" qualify as legitimate state interests in the exaction
context.).
48. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan C.A.T.V. Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438
n.16 (1982) (noting that -permanent physical occupation is taking per se).
49. Ld.(finding municipal ordinance forcing property owner to "allow" installation of a
cable television receiver "no bigger than a breadbox" on property as taking requiring
just-not nominal-compensation).
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just compensation under the Takings Clause. However, this syllogism failed the Builders. In the takings arena, government demands for money are not treated as physical appropriations of private property. 50 Unless money is physically taken by the government, it is not property for the purposes of the Takings Clause.5
The imposition of an exaction is not considered to be an "invasion" of a bank account.
B.

Regulatory Takings

The Builders, having failed to convince the Court that the
Ordinance was a per se taking falling automatically under the Fifth
Amendment, had to show that the Ordinance was a "regulatory"
taking requiring just compensation. The basic operative premise in
the regulatory takings area is that regulations or other government
actions, by going "too far," can take private property without effecting a permanent physical occupation. 52 Where construction of
a government dam caused flooding of private lands, a taking was
said to have occurred.5 3 Similarly, a statute went "too far" when
it made coal mining commercially impracticable'.
A regulation will be viewed as having gone "too far" if it
fails to "substantially advance" 55 legitimate state interests, 56 de-

50. See, e.g., United States v. Sperry Corp., 110 S. Ct. 387, 395 n.9 (1989) ('It is
artificial to view deductions of a percentage of a monetary award as physical appropriations of property. Unlike real or personal property, money is fungible."); Commercial
Builders, 941 F.2d at 875 (quoting Sperry). If the Supreme Court treated money as property for the purposes of the Takings Clause, the Sixteenth Amendment, which spawned
the federal income tax, would be locked in serious, perhaps mortal, conflict with the Fifth
Amendment.
51. See, e.g., Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)
(ruling that government seizure of interest on interpleader funds deposited with clerk of
county court constituted a taking).
52. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (Holmes, J.)
("The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
53. Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 179-80
(1871).
54. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393.
55. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.3 (1987); Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); see also Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188
(1928) (ruling that zoning restrictions must bear a "substantial relation" to the goals informing the valid exercise of a state's police power, i.e., public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare).
56. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)
(finding "character" of the governmental action a relevant factor in regulatory takings
inquiries).
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nies an owner, even temporarily,5 7 'economically viable use' 58 of
his property 9 or interferes with his 'reasonable investment-backed
profit
expectations.' 6 ' Although Sacramento's Ordinance reduced the present value of exploitable non-residential property by
increasing the costs of its commercial use, 2 the Builders did not
argue unreasonable value impairment. Instead, they concentrated on
whether the impact of development warranted the imposition embodied in the Ordinance' and whether the Ordinance effectively
advanced the state interest in mitigating the alleged impact. 6'
The Builders' omission of a challenge based on the
Ordinance's interference with property value is probably due to the
impotence of the "value" arguments. The Supreme Court's failure
to fully develop the "economically viable use" or "reasonable
investment-backed profit expectations" concepts is the main reason
the value arguments are generally of little value to property owners.65 Favoring pragmatism over principle,66 the Court engages in
regulatory takings inquiries on an essentially "ad hoc, factual basis."'67 In a historical context, this flexible approach has done little
to change the jurisprudential landscape.

57. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding three-year moratorium on the issuance of building
permits to be a taking).
58. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 US. 104, 138 n.36 (1978).
59. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
60. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985) (referring to the reasonable, investment-backed, profit expectations factor).
61. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (providing the reasonable investment-backed expectations factor).
62. While the Builders can pass a portion of the exaction on to their customers, a portion of the exaction cannot be distributed. The amount of the non-allocable costs of the
exaction depends on the level of competition in the market for non-residential development. If competition is intense, fewer costs can be passed on to the customer. If competition is weak, a commercial developer can pass on more costs by raising prices, until he
raises prices too much and more efficient suppliers are attracted to the market in the long
run resulting in stiffer competition. Assuming a competitive market for non-residential
development in Sacramento, it is reasonable to conclude that the non-allocable costs of
the Ordinance would adversely affect the profits the Builders would have enjoyed before
imposition of the Ordinance.
63. See infra text accompanying note 81.
64. See infra text accompanying note 82.
65. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992)
("[The] uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in our "deprivation"
fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court.").
66. Or perhaps, pragmatism as a principle.
67. Berger, supra note 46, at 758-59; see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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Prior, to the Court's incorporation of value impairment factors
into regulatory takings jurisprudence, regulations causing value
diminutions of up to 92.5% had escaped classification as takings.
For example, a zoning ordinance prohibiting the construction of
factories on certain land, thereby causing the value of the land to
diminish by 75%, was not a taking. 68 Likewise, an ordinance prohibiting the operation of a long-established brickmaking facility,
situated on land which the enacting municipality had just annexed,
avoided classification as a taking despite reducing the property's
value from $800,000 to $60,000.69
After the Court's recognition of value impairment as a relevant
factor, regulations causing even greater value impairments were
ruled to be mere regulations instead of regulatory takings. Since
courts lack a definition of "economically viable use," they have
relied on pre-"value impairment" cases to hold that regulations
causing value diminutions of up to 95% do not deny an owner
economically viable use of his property.7" For example, a modified zoning ordinance invalidating a previously granted permit to
build a high-rise apartment and reducing the property's value from
$2,000,000 to $100,000 was held not to constitute a denial of
economically viable use." Reasonable, and thus non-compensable,
use restrictions have also included total prohibitions on construction
designed to preserve "open space" on private property.72
Additional examples of reasonable use restrictions include an
ordinance forbidding the destruction of "landmark" properties such
as Grand Central Station73 and an outright denial of a permit to
build on property classified as a wetland.74 Adding to the ineffectiveness of the undefined "reasonable, investment-backed, profit expectations" concept, the Supreme Court categorized the "loss of
future profits" as a "slender reed upon which to rest a takings

68. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384, 388 (1926) (value
reduced from $10,000 to $2,500).
69. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405, 409-10 (1915).
70. See Berger, supra note 46, at 758, 762-63.
71. William C. Haas & Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1120
(9th Cir. 1979).
72. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
73. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
74. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121' 127 (1985) (-Only
when a permit [to use property classified as a 'wetland'] is denied and the effect of the
denial is to prevent 'economically viable' use of the land in question can it be said that
a taking has occurred.").
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claim."7 5 Understandably then, the Builders did not rest their takings claim on either a reasonable profit expectation or an economically viable use theory.
C.

Exactions as Takings: Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission

No.llan v. California Coastal Commission controls regulatory
takings inquiries where the government conditions the use of property on the payment of an exaction. 6 An exaction can take the
form of an "impact fee" to offset the negative social impact of
development, as in Commercial Builders, or may consist of the
transfer of an interest in real property as a pre-condition to such
development. In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission, an
instrumentality of the state, conditioned the issuance of a building
permit on the grant of an easement to provide
for public access
7
across the beachfront portion of a private lot. "
The Commission argued that the Nollans' use of their property
to construct a home would burden the state by creating a psychological barrier to physical and "visual" beach access. 7 1 The Commission contended that this severe burdening of state interests
warranted a prohibition on construction. Therefore, if the state
could prohibit construction, it could certainly condition construction
on the Nollan's transfer of an easement to alleviate the burden
caused by development. The Supreme Court of the United States
agreed with this argument, but required the state to pay for the
79
easement.
Rejecting dissenting Justice Brennan's call for the application
of rational basis scrutiny, 0 the Nollan Court synthesized three
criteria in formulating a test to determine when development exactions metamorphose from regulations into takings requiring just

75. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (involving a statute prohibiting the sale
but not the possession of federally-protected bird feathers).
76. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
77. Id. at 827-28.
78. Id. at 835.
79. Id. at 835-36.
80. Id. at 836 n.3. The Court noted that Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962),
appeared to assume that mere rational basis scrutiny was applicable to takings challenges,
but that such an assumption was incorrect. The correct standard of review is stricter.
Thus, exactions that are merely regulations the government "could rationally have decided . . . might achieve the State's objective" will not pass muster. Id. (quoting Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981).
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compensation. First, the "proportionality" prong of the test requires
that a development condition, such as the conditional grant of a
building permit, be reasonably related to the burden created by
development." The proportionality prong gauges the degree of
negative social impact required to warrant the imposition of an
exaction on development.
Next, the "utility" prong of the Nollan test requires that any
imposed development condition "substantially advance" a legitimate
police power purpose. 2 The utility prong measures the effectiveness of the exaction in accomplishing its stated purpose of mitigating the impact of development. Finally, the "interference" prong of
the Nollan test prohibits development conditions such as outright
refusals to issue a building permit from "interfer[ing] so drastically83
use of [the] property [as] to constitute a taking."
with the ...
The interference prong serves as a societal acknowledgment that
exclusive use is a fundamental attribute of property ownership.
In relation to the interference prong of the test, the Nollan
Court recognized that while the outright denial of a building permit
would be permissible if construction "substantially impeded" valid
state purposes, such a denial could rise to the level of a taking,
thus requiring the payment of just compensation." In connection
with the utility prong of the test, the Court took the view that a
"broad range of governmental purposes," including California's
goal of overcoming the psychological barriers to beach access,
could be construed as legitimate.85
With respect to the proportionality prong of the test, the
Nollan Court did not explicitly decide how "close a 'fit"' was
required between the permit condition and the burden created by
private development because the condition at issue failed to meet

81. Id, at 834 ("[A] use restriction may constitute a "taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose." (quoting Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978)).
82. Id. ("[L]and-use regulation does not effect a taking if it "substantially advance[s]
legitimate state interests . .. ." (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980)).
83. Id. at 835-36. Interference prohibited under Nollan may also take the form of preventing an owner from using his property in an economically viable manner. See id. at
834.
84. Id. at 833. Notwithstanding this theoretical avenue of litigation, the interference
prong of the Nollan test alludes to the moribund "interference with reasonable profit expectations" and "economically viable use" criteria. See discussion supra part III.B.
85. Id. at 833.
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"even the most untailored standards."86 However, the Court inferentially outlined the contours of a suitable degree of 'fit.' The
Court accepted, for "purposes of discussion only," that a condition
"reasonably related"87 to a burden created by private development
would constitute a valid exercise of a state's police power if the
condition imposed advanced the same interests as a prohibition.8
D.

Takings and the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions

The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions limits the
government's ability to condition the receipt of government benefits
upon the relinquishment of constitutional rights.89 The essence of
the doctrine is that the government may not accomplish indirectly
what it is forbidden to accomplish directly. 90 Government actions
which condition the receipt of benefits such as welfare payments, 91 the use of public highways, 92 or the vacation of public
streets9 3 upon the relinquishment of a constitutional right such as
the right to receive just compensation for takingse or the right to
free speech,95 will be struck down as "unconstitutional condi-

86. Id. 483 U.S. at 838.
87. Id. at 838-39; see also discussion infra part IV.B.1 (analyzing the two extremes of
proportionality as they relate to reasonableness in the development exaction context).
88. The Court observed that a regulation that substitutes a condition for an otherwise
lawful prohibition and then "utterly fails to further the end advanced as a justification for
the prohibition" metamorphoses from a valid regulation into an "out-and-out plan of extortion." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.L.D. Assocs. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15
(N.H. 1981)).
89. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969); Frost Trucking v. Railroad
Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 591 (1926); see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413, 1422 (1989).
90. See Edward J. Fuhr, The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions and the First
Amendment, 39 CASE W. R.S. L. REV. 97, 98 (1989).
91. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627 n.6.
92. Frost, 271 U.S. at 591 ("It is very clear that the act, as thus applied, is in no real
sense a regulation of the use of the public highways. It is a regulation of the business of
those who are engaged in using them. Its primary purpose evidently is to protect the
business of those who are common carriers in fact by controlling competitive conditions.").
93. See Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983).
94. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV; Frost, 271 U.S. at 589-90 (statute
forcing private carrier to become public, and therefore regulated, carrier as a condition to
using public highways effected a taking under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Parks at 650-52 ("Mhe City may not condition street vacation on Klamath
waiving its fifth amendment right to just compensation for the geothermal wells.").
95. See U.S. CoNST. amend. I; Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that
public employer may not condition employment on employee relinquishing First Amendment right to freedom of expression).
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tions"' unless the conditions imposed are rationally related to the
benefits conferred.97
However, the "right to build on one's own property .. .cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental benefit."' ' 98 Thus,
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not germane to a case
involving the right to use private property in the absence of a
government benefit. 99 When the government conditions the exercise of an individual's right to build on his own property upon a
transfer of wealth to offset the 'impact' of the project, the takings
test formulated in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission" comes into play. Commercial Builders involved the imposition of a
fee on the right to build. No government benefit was implicated.
Thus, the Court's employment of Nollan's rights-based takings
analysis should have precluded the use of the privilege-based unconstitutional conditions doctrine.'

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Property Privileges?

Justice Scalia's opinion in Nollan underscores the proposition
that an individual right recognized by the Constitution is not a
government-created benefit.'" The Commercial Builders court
nonetheless treated the right to use private property, which informs
the Takings Clause, as a government benefit to be given or taken
away by legislative fiat. That approach is flawed.
The Commercial Builders case involved two rights, conditioning of a right to build upon the right to receive just compensation

96. See generally Comment, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595,
1600 (1960) (analyzing unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321, 353 (1935) (same).
97. Governmental benefits subject to analysis under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions also include unemployment benefits and permission to operate hydroelectric
facilities in navigable waters controlled by Congress. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 404-05 (1963) (unemployment benefits); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426-27 (1940) (hydroelectric power generation); Fox River Paper Co.
v. Railroad Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651 (1927) (same).
98. Nollan v. California Coastal Cornmn, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987).
99. See generally Sullivan, supra note 89 (discussing concept of 'germaneness' in
relation to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions).
100. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
101. But see William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968) (analyzing the decline of disparate
treatment for rights and privileges).
102. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987).
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for a taking of property. That transaction did not condition receipt
of a government benefit on the relinquishment of a right. Therefore, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions should have had no
bearing on the case. The Commercial Builders court nonetheless
brought the doctrine to bear, with damaging consequences to the
individual right to acquire, use and dispose of property.
The Builders had attacked the means used to advance the
City's interest in "expanding low-income housing," i.e., the conditioning of a building permit on the payment of a fee to pay for
housing projects notwithstanding the lack of proportionality between the exaction and the impact of the development.' ° The
Commercial Builders court countered with reference to Parks v.
Watson. 4 In Parks, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held
that a city ordinance conditioning the vacation of platted streets on
the relinquishment of the Fifth Amendment right to receive just
compensation for the compelled transfer of geothermal wells to the
city was an unconstitutional condition because the transfer requirement "had no rational relationship to any purpose related to the
vacation of the platted streets." 0 5
The Commercial Builders Court neglected to mention that
Parks involved the conditioning of a discretionary governmental
benefit, permission to vacate public streets. Commercial Builders,
on the other hand, addressed the issuance of a building permit,
which the Nollan Court had stated could not possibly be construed
as a governmental benefit."° If a building permit is not construed
as a government benefit, the principles of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions had no application in Commercial Builders.
Through its tacit invocation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine by reference to Parks v. Watson, the court implicitly equated
the right to use private property with the possibility of receiving
discretionary governmental benefits. However, the right to use
private property is just that, a right. It is not a unilaterally-created
benefit to be taken away upon mere notice and a hearing. The
Takings Clause demands more."°
Government benefits, in contrast to individual rights, possess

103. Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 873 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992).
104. 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983).
105. Parks, 716 F.2d at 653.
106. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2; see discussion supra part II.D.
107. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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the ephemeral nature of publicly-held property interests transferred,
vel non, at will and upon political expediency, to individual citizens. 108 The quality of the Commercial Builders court's reliance
on Parks supported an equation of individual rights with discretionary governmental benefits, seriously blurring the distinction between the two. The Fifth Amendment is hostile to such a relativistic perspective. The Takings Clause does not state that the government must pay for property when it feels like it, or that it may
take property without compensation when wielding the numerically
superior power of a majority. On the contrary, the Takings Clause
is phrased in absolute prohibitory terms: "Nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation. '"'09
The Takings Clause has three 'component functions. It serves
as a societal acknowledgment that private property exists; it absolutely prohibits uncompensated takings; and it provides a vehicle
for the transformation of private property into public property
through the payment of just compensation. Neutralization of these
functions requires a distortion of the concept of the right to acquire, use and dispose of private property. By equating the
Builders' right to use private property with the government benefit
of vacating public streets, the Commercial Builders court contributed to just such a distortion.
B.

Doctrinal (Con)fusion in Nollan-Land

Development exactions must satisfy the distinct proportionality,
utility and interference prongs of the Nollan test in order to pass
constitutional muster." ° In Commercial Builders, the distinct concepts of utility and proportionality"' should have been analyzed
individually. They were not. The court instead treated proportionality and utility as a single analytical component. This treatmemt
gave rise to a conflict. While proportionality, which is defined in
terms of reasonableness,"' may be said to call for intermediate
scrutiny, it may also reasonably be regarded as implicating closer
judicial review. Utility, however, is clearly defined along more de-

108. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 97.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also sources cited supra note 43.
110. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834, 835-36; supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
111. The Builders probably did not place primary emphasis on litigating interference
aspects of the ordinance. Regulatory takings which leave owners with at least 5% of the
property value satisfy the interference prong. See supra text accompanying notes 65-75.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 81, 86-88.
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manding lines and requires the application of a more rigorous
standard,' 1 3 namely, strict scrutiny." 4
To "resolve" the conflict resulting from the fusion of proportionality and utility, the Commercial Builders court focused exclusively on proportionality as the engine of exaction review. To this
end, the court interpreted an extremely heterogeneous body of
precedent"'5 as constituting a substantive consensus on the degree
of proportionality required between an exaction condition and the
negative impact of development. 6 The court considered the
proposition that the determination of proportionality requires less
than strict scrutiny to mean that Nollan permitted application of
rational basis scrutiny to every aspect of Sacramento's ordinance. 17 The Nollan Court, however, had ruled that the utility
attributes of exaction ordinances are subject to a much higher level
of review.' Moreover, support exists for the use of strict scrutiny in conjunction with all components of the Nollan test, not just
the utility prong. 19
1. A Consensus of Contradiction
Proportionality under Nollan addresses the closeness of the

113. See supra text accompanying notes 80, 82, 85.
114. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 61 n.76 (1989) (citing Nollan as evidence of
the Supreme Court's greater willingness to rule against government under the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause).
115. See discussion infra part IV.C.
116. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 874 ("We noted in Parks that the analysis we
applied was based on a consensus among the states that had considered the constitutionality of subdivision exaction regulations.").
117. Id. at 875 ("Nollan holds that where there is no evidence of a nexus between the
development and the problem the exaction seeks to address, the exaction cannot be upheld.").
118. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3 ('We have required that the regulation 'substantially
advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be achieved . . . not that the State 'could
rationally have decided' that the measure adopted might achieve the State's interest.").
See, e.g., Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process
Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1363, 1381 (1990) (discussing Nollan as requiring
logical relationship between purpose and condition and as seriously inquiring into ends of
regulation and means, requiring that regulation "substantially advance" a legitimate state
interest).
119. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1986 Term: Leading Cases, Constitutional
Law-Takings: Land Use Regulation, 101 HARV. L. REV. 240, 247, 249 (1987) (citing
Nollan as "troubling" because its indication that future regulations will be subject to a
higher level of scrutiny than that traditionally employed in "assessing claims of regulatory
takings").
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'fit' required between a development condition and the impact created by the targeted development.'
A development condition is
considered to be warranted under the proportionality prong if it is
reasonably related to the impact of development.' The Commercial Builders court, relying on Parks and Nollan, posited the existence of a centrist "consensus among the states" concerning the
meaning of what it termed a "rational relationship"'
for the
purposes of proportionality.'
Although the Nollan Court did cite a national range of decisions as illustrative of the approach to be taken with respect to
reasonableness 2 4 in the context of the proportionality prong,
these decisions vary widely in perspective and cannot reasonably
be considered to constitute a substantive consensus at all. The
proportionality decisions cited by the Commercial Builders and
Nollan courts can be classified into two main categories, those
decisions requiring a "direct" relationship between a development
condition and the negative impact of development and those requiring an "indirect" relationship.
While the principles underlying the "direct" decisions are
straightforward and easily applied, the "indirect" cases are notably
uninformed by principles susceptible to coherent application."z
The Nollan Court indicated a limit to the permissible level of
indirectness by referring to a third category of decisions-the Cali12 6
fornia state court decisions, which employ rational basis review
to require mere nominal proportionality-as entirely inapposite.'27
Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect121 represents the direct proportionality extreme of exaction
jurisprudence. In Pioneer Trust, a municipality conditioned the
approval of subdivision plans on the developer's transfer of land to
the public for the purpose of building schools.'29 While acknowl-

120. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838; supra text accompanying notes 81, 86-88.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 81, 87-88.
122. See infra text accompanying note 192.
123. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 874 (emphasis added).
124. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839-40.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 136-44.
126. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
127. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839 (-Our conclusion . . . is consistent with the approach
taken by every other court that has considered the question, with the exception of the
California state courts." (emphasis added).)
128. 176 N.E.2d 799 (111. 1961).
129. Id. at 800, 802.
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edging that the subdivision may have created the need for additional schools, the developer challenged the exaction ordinance as a
taking without just compensation. 13 The Supreme Court of Illinois held that such exactions are reasonable if the burden placed
on the developer is "specifically and uniquely attributable" to his
13
activity.'
Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek32
represents the nominal proportionality extreme of exaction jurisprudence. In Walnut Creek, subdivision developers challenged a
statute conditioning the approval of building plans upon the uncompensated transfer of land to the municipality as a taking without just compensation. 33 The Supreme Court of California, citing
the "melancholy aspect[s] of .. unprecedented -population increase[s]... " and the consequent elimination of open spaces,
held that a direct relationship between the ills sought to be alleviated by the exaction and the activities of the exactee was not required."3 The Walnut Creek rule requires merely that the exaction bear some relationship to the needs created by the develop35

ment.1

Parks v. Watson represents the "indirect" proportionality position. 36 The Parks court's opinion, upon which the Commercial
Builders court relied, 137 rejected both the Pioneer Trust and Walnut Creek views, professing to follow a centrist position. 38 However, the Parks court, like the Commercial Builders court, simply
asserted rather than developed a centrist position. 39 The principal
case Parks relied on' 4 for the existence of a middle standard,
Call v. City of West Jordan /,141 like Pioneer Trust and Walnut
Creek, addressed the determination of the reasonableness of exaction statutes in relation to the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.

130. Id. at 799-800, 802.
131. Id. at 802.
-132. 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (Cal.), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
133. Id. at 632.
134. Id. at 635.
135. Id. at 635, 636 n.6.
136. 716 F.2d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 1983); Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of
Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992).
137. Id. at 873-74.
138. Parks, 716 F.2d at 653.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, Call v.
City of W. Jordan II, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980).
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The Call I court required an exaction to have "some42 reasonable
relationship to the needs created by the development."
The Call I court, far from developing a centrist position, improvidently supported its "reasonable relationship" requirement with
decisions contradicting each other on the issue of proportionality.
First, the Call I court construed the requirement of a reasonable
relationship between exaction and social ill by citing decisions
advancing Pioneer Trust direct proportionality. 143 Then, in the
same paragraph, the court further supports the reasonableness standard by citing decisions advancing Walnut Creek nominal proportionality.'" Incredibly, no choice is made between the two positions. The Call I court, like the Parks and Commercial Builders
courts, made no attempt at synthesizing the divergent and incompatible positions.
Given this, the base of support for the Commercial Builder
court's centrist state consensus concerning proportionality for purposes of exaction analysis is a chimera. Two disparate lines of
thought concerning the degree of fit required between an exaction
and the social ills created by development remain unresolved. The
Pioneer Trust view requires the social ills sought to be alleviated
by an exaction to be "specifically and uniquely attributable" or
directly proportional to development. The Walnut Creek view maintains that the exaction need only bear "some relationship" or be

142. Call I, 606 P.2d at 220. The Call I court's formulation appears to be an amalgamation of the nominal position's requirement that the condition bear "some" relationship
to the problems created by development and the indirect position's requirement that such
a relationship be "reasonable." See supra text accompanying notes 132-39.
143. See Call I, 606 P.2d at 220 n.6 (citing Aunt Hack Ridge Estates v. Planning
Comm'n of Danbury, 230 A.2d 45, 47 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1967) (striking down exaction
as an unconstitutional tax for failure to limit the use of monies collected to the direct
benefit of targeted subdivision), certifying questions to Aunt Hack Ridge Estates v. Planning Comm'n of Danbury, 273 A.2d 880, 881, 84-85 (Conn. 1970) (application of exaction statute and attendant regulations was permissible exercise of police power provided
the resulting exactions were "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the activities of
development); and, Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 369 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Il1. 1977) (explicitly following the Pioneer Trust rule that exactions must be "specifically and uniquely
attributable" to the exactee's activities)); supra text accompanying notes 128-31.
144. See Call I, 606 P.2d at 220 n.6 (citing Home Builders, Inc. v. Kansas City, 555
S.W.2d 832, 835 (Mo. 1977) (rejecting the Pioneer Trust "specifically and uniquely attributable" requirement as too restrictive, and permitting uncompensated transfers of land to
the government upon the mere threat of a need for social goods created to some degree
by development)); Call I, 606 P.2d at 220 n.7 (citing Associated Home Builders, Inc. v.
City of Walnut Creek, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (Cal.), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971));
supra text accompanying notes 132-35.
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nominally proportional to development.
The Commercial Builders court posited a centrist consensus,
relying on Parks. The Parks court posited a centrist consensus,
relying on Call L The Call I court posited a centrist consensus,
construing the reasonable relationship required between exactions
and the impact of development as being informed by both the
Pioneer Trust and Walnut Creek positions. The concurrent advancement of these unharmonized positions constitutes contradiction, not
consensus.
The incoherent position demonstrated by the indirect proportionality decisions should not be viewed as a standard at all. Since
the Commercial Builders court could not possibly have applied a
standard that did not exist, its purported application of indirect
proportionality is illogical. The experience of the various courts
ruling on the constitutionality of exaction ordinances had led to the
identification of two meaningful categories of proportionality, direct
and nominal.145 By explicitly rejecting direct proportionality and
purporting to follow the indirect proportionality"4 non-standard,
the Commercial Builders court could only have applied the one remaining standard, nominal proportionality, a concept rejected out of
hand by the Nollan court. 47
48
2. Rational Basis = Anything Goes1

The Commercial Builders court's reliance on the indirect proportionality non-standard and consequent dependence on nominal
proportionality gave rise to an improper application of rational
basis scrutiny to the ordinance. Under the rational basis standard, 49 exactions are "sustained .
merely because there is

145. See supra text accompanying notes 128-35.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
147. See supra note 127 and text accompanying notes 124-27.
148. See Charles Siemon, The Paradox of "In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan"
and Post Hoc Rationalizations: The Need For Efficient and Effective Judicial Review of
Land Use Regulations, 16 STETSON L. REV. 603, 605-06 (1987) (describing rational basis
review as the 'anything goes' standard of judicial review); Happy Birthday, Constitution,
supra note 46, at 753-54 (analyzing the deferential rational basis standard of review in
the regulatory takings context).
149.

See United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 154 (1938) ("[R]egulatory

legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators . . . . [W]here the legislative judgment is
drawn into question, [the inquiry] must be restricted to the issue whether any state bf
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some reasonable basis for believing that [they] might be necessary." 15" Under the Court's negatively phrased formulation, exactions will be upheld unless "there is no evidence of a nexus between the development and the problem the exaction seeks to address ..
151
Further manifesting its fealty to the rational basis approach,
the Commercial Builders court maintained that only conditions on
development which lack "any rational relationship" to the activity
targeted will be construed as not reasonably related to that activity
and thus impermissible. 152 This view is partially correct yet wholly misleading. The court's advancement of such a minimalistic
position as the complete approach to exaction questions is deficient
because it merely describes the proportionality requirement through
a rational basis lens. The Nollan court, however, had expressly
rejected the use of rational basis scrutiny in any exaction analysis
context. 53 The correct mode of analysis focuses on both proportionality and utility, and it examines the latter with a strict scrutiny
eye.
While the proportionality prong determines whether an exaction is warranted, the utility prong measures an exaction's effectiveness in advancing its stated objectives, i.e., mitigating the impact of development."" A development condition is considered to
be effective if it "substantially advance[s]" its stated objective. 155
The Nollan Court, in its exegesis of the utility requirement, had
clearly rejected the use of rational basis scrutiny in determining the
effectiveness of exaction ordinances.156 The Nollan Court explained in detail how the utility component of its takings test re-

facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for the legislation."); see generally, JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
11.4 (4th ed. 1991).
150. Happy Birthday, ,Constitution, supra note 46, at 753 (emphasis added); see also
Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634 (Cal.)
(upholding a subdivision exaction statute on the basis of, inter alia, future needs for recreation, potential population factors, and a general public need for recreational facilities
caused by future subdivisions), appeal disnissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); supra text accompanying notes 132-35.
151. Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 875 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992) (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 873 (emphasis added).
153. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n.3; supra note 80 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
155. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; supra text accompanying note 82.
156. Id. at 834 n.3; supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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quired a more directs connection between an exaction and its
stated objective. 58 Importantly, the Court dismissed the rational
basis view that a regulation substantially advances a legitimate state
interest when "the State 'could rationally have decided' that the
measure adopted might achieve the State's objective."' 59

Despite the Supreme Court's guidance,1 "° the Commercial
Builders court refused to subject the ordinance to anything other
than the lowest level of review.16' The Builders had argued that
Nollan's utility prong mandated the application of strict scrutiny.
The Commercial Builders eut rejected this argument,
contending that exaction conditions "that the government might
'rationally have decided' to employ for a given legitimate purpose"
are not in conflict with the principles of Nollan. 63The court
clearly failed to construe and apply Nollan. The court's subsequent
application of rational basis scrutiny to a strict scrutiny scenario
strikes at the heart of Commercial Builders's validity.
3.

Goldblatt: Reverse Alchemy

Since the Commercial Builders court did not ground its opinion in the heightened scrutiny precepts of the Nollan decision, it
had to seek support further afield. To this end, the court manifested its determination to shield Sacramento's ordinance from strict
scrutiny by premising its opinion on decisions relying on Goldblatt
v. Hempstead."4 This stance is deeply troubling because the
Nollan court had roundly criticized Goldblatt's entire approach to
regulatory takings analysis. In explicating the requirement of a

157. See, e.g., Note, Taking a Step Back: A Reconsideration of the Takings Test of
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 102 HARV. L. REV. 448, 450 (1988) (arguing
that Nolan made way for the application of heightened scrutiny to regulations resulting in
reduction of property value); 1986 Term, supra note 119, at 24849 (describing the Nollan
Court as refusing to adopt a standard of minimum rationality and insisting that permit
conditions "substantially advanc[e]" the conditions' purpose as evidence of the Court's
articulation of heightened scrutiny for "regulations challenged under the Takings Clause").
158. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3; supra note 80 and accompanying text.
159. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3.
160. See, e.g., 1986 Term, supra note 119, at 24546 (presenting Nollan as subjecting
land use regulations to a "heightened standard of judicial review" and as signalling the
Supreme Court's willingness to expand property rights under the Takings Clause).
161. Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874-75 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992).
162. Id. at 874.
163. Id.
164. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
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higher level of scrutiny in takings. cases, the Nollan court stated
"[tihere is no reason to believe [and] ... some reason to disbelieve . . . that so long as the regulation of property is at issue the
standards for takings challenges, due process challenges, and equal
protection challenges are identical" and while "Goldblatt v.
Hempstead d[id] appear to assume that the inquiries are the
same, . . . that assumption is inconsistent with the formulations in
our later cases." 65
The Goldblatt case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of an exercise of police power in the form of a zoning ordinance. The ordinance prohibited activities on private land that had
been taking place for several years." The land owner challenged
the prohibition as a taking without just compensation. The
Goldblatt Court, employing rational basis scrutiny,167 upheld the
prohibition as presumptively valid in light of the owner's failure to
demonstrate its unreasonableness.'" The Nollan court has clearly
rejected the use of this type of scrutiny and its attendant allocation
of burdens in takings challenges.1 69 The Commercial Builders
Court nonetheless categorized Nollan and lower court decisions as
Goldblatt-type review of
permitting essentially 7 cursory 70
Sacramento's ordinance.1 '
One of these decisions is Rogin v. Bensalem Township,'72
upon which the Commercial Builders court relied for the proposition that exactions will be upheld when they are reasonably related
to a legitimate public purpose. 73 In Rogin, a builder who had
completed a substantial portion of a previously approved housing
development challenged a subsequent zoning ordinance which prohibited him from completing the development as originally ap-

165. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3.
166. Goblatt, 369 U.S. at 592.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50.
168. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 596.
169. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835.

170. See Russell W. Galloway Jr., Means-Ends Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law,
21 LoY. L.A. L. REV., 449, 452 (1988) (characterizing rationality review as so deferential
it is named the "hands off" approach); see also Happy Birthday, Constitution, supra note
46, at 753-54.
171. Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874-75

("[W]e are not persuaded that Nollan materially changes the level of scrutiny we must
apply to this Ordinance."), cert. denied, S. Ct. 1997 (1992).
172. 616 F.2d 680, 682 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub noam. Mark Garner Assoc. v.

Bensalem Township, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981).
173. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 874.

19921

COMMERCE CREATES POVERTY

1363

proved by the municipality. 7 4 In upholding the ordinance, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit relied on Goldblatt as illustrative of the Supreme Court's approach to takings questions. 5
However, the Supreme Court's singling out of the Goldblatt approach to takings inquiries as inappropriate176 strikes at the validity of the Commercial Builders court's reliance on Rogin's formulation.
Further, in expounding what amounted to a pure police power
view of regulatory takings, the Rogin court focused on a state's
power to enact exaction ordinances without regard to the justification for such state action. In essence, the police power used to
further a multiplicity of government ends serves as its own justification. Under the Rogin formulation, any legitimate state interest'" can justify the imposition of an exaction. This pure police
power view, advanced by Rogin and echoed in Commercial Builders, does not question whether exaction ordinances are either warranted under the proportionality prong or effective under the utility
prong of the Nollan test.'
The Commercial Builders court's reliance on Maher v. City of
New Orleans"9 strikes a similarly dissonant chord. 80 In Maher,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Goldblatt for the proposition that a state's exercise of its police power to prohibit a use
of property "adverse to the public weal" does not implicate the
doctrine of eminent domain."8 That position is incorrect. The
Nollan Court noted that even proper exercises of the police power
may constitute takings.'82 Under Nollan, the outright denial of a
building permit, despite furthering a state, interest by prohibiting

174. Rogin, 616 F.2d at 682.
175. Rogin, 616 F.2d at 690-92, 691 n.53.
176. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3; see also supra text accompanying note 165; Happy
Birthday, Constitution, supra note 46, at 753 n.96 (arguing that Nollan heightened the
standard of review in exaction cases and that Rogin "would seem to violate the Nollan
standard.").
177. Given the "broad range of governmental purposes" which qualify as legitimate state
interests, "any legitimate state interest" really means any interest within the galactic scope
of the vaguely defined police power. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35 (defining legitimate
state interests broadly).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
179. 516 F.2d 1051, reh'g denied, 521 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
905 (1976).
180. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 874.
181. Maher, 516 F.2d at 1065.
182. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-36.
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private activity that substantially impedes public purposes, may
constitute an interference with private
property, triggering the re3
quirement of just compensation.1
In contrast, an exaction ordinance which furthers a legitimate
public purpose will seldom be struck down as an uncompensated
taking under the Maher formulation. Both the Maher and Commercial Builders decisions treat the use of private property as a potential noxious use for purposes of regulation pursuant to the police
power. However, the Supreme Court's recent condemnation of the
noxious use theory in regulatory takings analysis coupled with
Maher's reliance on Goldblatt further demonstrates the incorrectness of the Commercial Builders court's reliance on Maher and
other cases relying on Goldblatt.' 4
The court's dependence on the Goldblatt principles was instrumental to its conclusion that the ordinance did not run afoul of the
Takings Clause. But since the Nollan Court had clearly identified
the Goldblatt approach to takings as aberrational, the Commercial
Builders court's premise-and its conclusion-are quite ill-founded.
C.

The Irrational Basis of Fictive Causality

Had the Commercial Builders court properly construed and
applied the Nollan test, the ordinance's permit condition would certainly have been struck down under Nollan's utility prong ts - for
failing to "substantially advance" a legitimate government purpose.
Evidence noted by dissenting Judge Beezer suggests that the Ordinance should not even have passed muster under the much weaker
rational basis standard.'86 The court's failure to apply the proper
level of scrutiny to the individual proportionality and utility aspects
of the ordinance in Commercial Builders will force property holders in the future to bear the costs of the consequent irrationality.
Despite the stricter review demanded by Nollan, the Commercial Builders court opined that the ordinance was "not an unconstitutional taking" because it bore a "rational relationship" to the cost

183. Id. at 835-36; see also supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
184. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897 (1992) (rejecting the argument that noxious uses of property "may be proscribed by government
regulation without the requirements of compensation").
185. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
186. Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, .941 F.2d 872, 877 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992).
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"closely associated" with the development. 187 While the Nollan
Court did cite a range of decisions as supporting the requirement
that a permit condition, at the very least, be reasonably related to
its alleged purpose, this merely described a minimum-not a maximum-standard for proportionality analysis.""
The Nollan Court had specifically and emphatically rejected
the use of rational basis scrutiny in the exaction context, then
proceeded to define the nature of the reasonable relationship required in exaction cases in terms of proportionality."' The Commercial Builders court, however, did not regard Nollan as having
given precedential content to reasonable relationship analysis," 9
preferring to treat the words "rational" 19' and "reasonable" as
shibboleths for rational basis scrutiny, the approach explicitly- rejected in Nollan.192
In the Commercial Builders court's view, the two factors
supporting a rational relationship were a City-commissioned study
that had "revealed" a likelihood that low-rent housing projects
would "become necessary as a direct result" of the workers "associated with the ...
development," and the assessment of a "small
portion of a conservative estimate" of the cost of the projects. 93
However, the study itself had reported "that its 'nexus' analysis
does not make the case that building construction is responsible for
1 94
growth."
Under these facts, even if Nollan had not "materially changed
the level of scrutiny" to be applied to exaction ordinances, 95 the
very terms of the document upon which the Commercial Builders
court premised its determination of the ordinance's rationality, and
therefore constitutionality, were contradictory and thus irrational by

187. Id. at 874.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81, 86-88.
190. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 874.
191. Cf Note, supra note 118, at 1381-82 (arguing that importing Nollan-type meansends scrutiny into due process clause would give "analytical content" to the "now meaningless" 'rational relationship' test).
192. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 874-75; see supra note 80 and accompanying
text.
193. Commercial Builders at 874 (emphasis added). Even a "small portion" of a "conservative estimate" of a study, if that study is empirically suspect, as the dissent suggests,
does not convert subjective opinion into objective fact. See id. at 877 (Beezer, J., dissent-

ing).
194. Id. at 877 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 874.
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definition, failing even the government-deferential rational basis
standard. '9
Upholding the ordinance on the basis of such contradictory
data was tantamount to a conclusion that the City "irrationally
could have decided" that the ordinance was related to its alleged
purpose. Nonsense. The Commercial Builders court's ultra-lax
standard of review invites revenue-hungry governments to observe
the form of rationality by employing the "slick 'p.r."" 1 97 technique of commissioning'"8 nexus studies while ignoring substantive empirical components of those studies which undermine the
finding of causal relationships among development, exactions and
negative social impact.
The victim of the resulting fictive causality is the individual
identified as the "cause" necessitating government action, e.g., the
redistribution of money for low-rent housing projects, where that
individual has neither control over the initiation of the system of
transfer payments, nor control over future "needs" created by legislative fiat.
V.

SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS

While the Commercial Builders court's use of rational basis
scrutiny' precluded substantive analysis of the ordinance's effectiveness2" under the Nollan test's utility prong,"' dissenting
Judge Beezer's classification of the ordinance as "nothing more
than a convenient way to fund a system of transfer payments " "
suggests the issue of effectiveness was one on which reasonable
minds could differ.

196. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
197. See Happy Birthday, Constitution, supra note 46, at 753.
198. Keeping in mind that there are lies, 'damn lies, and statistics, the fact remains that
rational purveyors of statistical studies have an incentive to satisfy their clients. If a client
suggests a theory of causation, as the City did in Commercial Builders, the firm providing
a causal study has an incentive to disregard alternate theories. See Commercial Builders,
941 F.2d at 873 (City of Sacramento commissioned Keyser-Marston Associates to study,
inter alia, "the appropriateness of exacting fees in conjunction with [non-residential] development to pay for [low-income] housing"); Joyce Routson, Jerry Keyser: He Turns
Dreams Into 'Realty,' S.F. Bus. J., Oct. 27, 1986, § 1, at 1 (noting principal of firmn
commissioned by City committed to making political deals to -make everybody happy").
Everybody, it seems, except the Builders.
199. See discussion supra part IV.B.
200. See supra text accompanying note 82.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
202. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 877 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
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The dissent's alternative view of the Ordinance's effectiveness
expands the analytical horizon, permitting the societal implications
of the Commercial Builders decision to be determined inferentially.
It is reasonable to conclude that elected representatives probably
want to remain in office. It is also reasonable to conclude that
elected representatives are generally sensitive to the desires of a
majority of their constituents. Thus, it is hardly unreasonable to
suspect that legislatures with the power to shift "burdens which in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole '2 3 onto the shoulders of politically insignificant individuals will generally do so.
The general nature of the political dynamic influencing the
actions of legislatures, to whom the Commercial Builders court
accorded virtually plenary power to dilute the property rights of
individuals, may be reason enough to restrict legislative power in
the takings area. However, the interests of precision compel the explication of at least five discrete incentives which could encourage
legislatures to shift societal burdens from society as a whole to
democratically disarmed individuals.
First, the legislature can gain the favor of a majority of citizens by providing public goods without raising taxes. Judge Beezer
considered this type of motivation to be the main reason behind
the ordinance.20 t Second, the legislature can arbitrarily expand its
exaction power by simply expanding the list of welfare benefits it
feels the majority of voters "need." The Commercial Builders court
equated "need" with demand. It would profit legislatures to do the
same. Third, the legislature's power to halt development by the
imposition of onerous conditions encourages developers to influence
the legislature financially.
Fourth, the legislature's discretion in exercising its exaction
power encourages established property owners to influence the
legislature to wield its power to exclude new entrants from a given
market.0" Fifth, the legislature can gain public favor by bringing
its exaction power to bear upon rich developers, a perennially easy
target. Thus, all potential development roads lead to the legislature
203. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
204. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 877 (Beezer, J.,dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 98.
205. See Mike McCarthy, Housing Task Force Urges New Fees, Tax, BUS. J. SAcRAmENTo, July 11, 1988, § 1, at 1 ("[I]f [the study concludes that] development creates
need for [social programs,] then [the] study [is] ridiculous on its face." (pre-Commercial
Builders statement of Edward J. Connor, who argued for the Builders)).
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because that is where the power to destroy or maintain wealth is
exercised. The absence of counter-incentives to temper the
legislature's exaction power exacerbates this legiscentric focus.
This is not to suggest that the conduct of legislators will necessarily be anything less than meretricious. The trusting Commercial Builders court regarded legislative wisdom with respect to the
treatment of individuals as an article of faith. However, given the
range of perverse incentives to which legislatures are exposed,
further abuse of the exaction power resulting in the violation of the
property rights of individuals is not only possible, it is likely.
Indeed, the arbitrariness of this power is the soul of its despotism.
The Commercial Builders dissent succinctly identified the
broad scope of this arbitrariness, warning that "new workers attracted by the new jobs associated with the new development surely
will increase the demand for all manner of goods and services. If
Sacramento has shown a sufficient causal connection in this case,
we can be expected next to uphold exactions imposed on developers to subsidize small business retailers, child-care programs, food
services and health-care delivery systems." 2°6 The Commercial
Builders decision encourages such developments.
Indeed, opening the box on linkage fees would vividly illustrate Tocqueville's concept of the profligacy of democracies.0 7
Yet, the United States is not an absolute democracy, but a republic
in which the Constitution is supposed to protect the rights of that
smallest minority, 208 the individual, from infringement by the majority-a real danger 200 years ago, a real danger today. The Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause is supposed to preclude uncompensated seizures of property, including property in its most liquid
form, money. The Takings Clause is a broken contract in the eyes
of the Commercial Builders of Northern California. The Supreme
Court had the opportunity to correct the grievous injustice resulting
from the Commercial Builders decision, but it declined to do

206. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 878 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
207. Tocqueville reasoned that governments representing those with the least property
would be the least economical in voting themselves benefits. "As most of the voters then
have no taxable [or takable] property, apparently all money spent in the interests of society can only profit and never harm them; and those who do have a little property easily
find ways of imposing a tax [or enacting an ordinance] so that it will weigh only on the
rich and bring nothing but profit to the poor, and that is something the like of which the
rich cannot do when they are masters of the government.- ALEXIS DE TOCQJEVILLE,
DIEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 209-10 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans., 1969).
208. AYN RAND, CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 61 (1967).
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so.
Thus, Commercial
Builders
and America's
creatingresidents
seem to be
living instands
the wrong
country. wealth-

I)moTHY M. TESLuK

209. Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992).

